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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to assist the Get Away Special (GAS) experimenter
in conducting a thorough structural verification of its experiment structural
configuration, thus expediting the structural review/approval process and the safety
process in general. Material selection for structural subsystems will be covered
with an emphasis on fasteners (GSFC fastener integrity requirements) and primary
support structures [Stress Corrosion Cracking requirements and National Space
Transportation System (NSTS) requirements]. Different approaches to structural
verifications (tests and analyses) will be outlined especially those stemming from
lessons learned on load and fundamental frequency verification. In addition,
fracture control will be covered for those payloads that utilize a door assembly or
modify the containment provided by the standard GAS Experiment Mounting Plate (EMP).
Structural hazard assessment and the preparation of structural hazard reports will
be reviewed to form a summation of structural safety issues for inclusion in the
safety data package.
INTRODUCTION
All GAS experimenters must conduct a structural verification of experiment
support structures in accordance with National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) requirements. The structural review/approval cycle is a mandatory step in the
NSTS safety process and is required for GAS experiments to receive approval for
flight on the Space Shuttle.
The unique scientific objectives and mission requirements of the specific
experiments being conducted will determine the experiment primary support structure.
After the design of the primary support structure has been established, the
structure can be further developed depending on experiment subsystems. For
instance, electronics, power, or fluid subsystems may be further contained within
individual boxes. The experiment structure selection process is finalized by
determining the materials with which to build the support structure as well as the
fasteners that will mount and hold the structure together. The experiment structure
must be ultimately designed to attach to NASA standard hardware and will be
cantilevered from the NASA mounting surface with lateral support in the form of
bumpers at the free end of the experiment structure.
Once the experiment support structure materials and design have been selected,
the payload organization is required to verify that the structure can withstand the
worst case loading and vibration requirements associated with the launch and landing
of the Space Shuttle. Since most Space Shuttle payloads are required to verify
structures by a combination of analysis and test, the GAS experimenter is fortunate
to be able to verify compliance with NSTS structural requirements by analysis only.
If so desired, the GAS experimenter may verify compliance by a combination of
analysis and test.
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MATERIALS SELECTION
Before the support structure is verified via analysis or test, the payload
organization must select structural materials that are acceptable to NASA.
Particular scrutiny is given to the primary load bearing structure and the
structural fasteners.
Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
One of the major concerns associated with materials selection for the primary
support structure, fasteners, support brackets, and mounting hardware is Stress
Corrosion Cracking (SCC). SCC is defined in MSFC-SPEC-522, Design Criteria for
Controlling Stress Corrosion Cracking, as "the combined action of sustained tensile
stress and corrosion to cause premature failure of materials." Certain materials
are more susceptible to corrosion; and when these materials are subjected to
corrosion inducing environments, cracking and subsequent failure under loading will
occur at lower stress levels than normal for the material. The corrosion leading to
failure in many cases is not necessarily severe enough to be visible to the human
eye. However, especially in the corrosive seacoast environment of the Kennedy Space
Center (where GAS payloads reside for at least three months before flight on the
Space Shuttle), SCC must be addressed since structures will be subjected to
additive tensile stresses from assembly, transportation, storage and ultimately, the
Space Shuttle mission. The Marshall Space Flight Center has conducted tests on
numerous structural materials under a simulated seacoast environment that is similar
in both temperature and chemical exposure to the environment that a GAS payload will
experience. Table 1 of MSFC-SPEC-522 lists the alloys that exhibit a high
resistance to SCC and these alloys are acceptable for all structural applications in
GAS payloads. GAS payloads should select structural materials from Table i of MSFC-
SPEC-522.
Materials listed in Table 1 of MSFC-SPEC-522 are in full compliance with NSTS
1700.7, Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the Space Transportation
System, requirements concerning stress corrosion. Protective coatings such as
electroplating, anodizing, alodining, iriditing, and chemical conversion coatings
applied to alloys with high resistance to SCC have no affect upon the stress
corrosion rating of the alloy. Surface treatments such as carburizing and nitriding
may adversely affect the stress corrosion rating. Any alloy surface treatment must
be identified when the experiment materials list is submitted. Use of dissimilar
metals that are not protectively coated should be avoided especially in
reinforcement applications (for example, brackets or braces), because the dissimilar
metals may form electrical couples which could lead to galvanic corrosion.
Fasteners
Fastener materials selection for GAS payloads is dependent upon the GAS
canister configuration selected by the payload organization. For GAS payloads that
utilize an opening door assembly or for other payloads that require fracture control
due to deviance from the standard sealed GAS canister configuration, compliance with
the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Fastener Integrity Requirements (GSFC
Document #S-313-100) is mandatory. This means that the payload organization must
either select fasteners from the GSFC approved manufacturers list (Appendix I of
GSFC S-313-100) or fasteners must be in accordance with GSFC S-313-100 which may
mean conducting quality assurance screening tests and inspections as well as
traceability. In addition, for GAS payloads that require fracture control, the
fasteners must employ positive retention such as lock wire or lock nuts. For GAS
payloads that remain in the standard sealed GAS canister configuration, it is
preferred but not required that the payload organization select fasteners from the
GSFC approved manufacturers list.
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STRUCTURAL VERIFICATION
The basic requirements for all GAS experiment support structures are as
follows:
I) The structure must withstand flight limit loads of i0 g's in the X, Y, and
Z axes with an ultimate factor of safety of 2.0 when verified by analysis
only or an ultimate factor of safety of 1.5 when verified by test to a
yield factor of safety of 1.25. The structure must also exhibit positive
margins of safety under these loads. The loads must be combined using the
X, Y, and Z loads in the worst case loading conditions (this means
combining compression, tension, bending, and shear stresses). The Space
Shuttle coordinate system (Figure I) is used for defining the load
direction.
2) The fundamental frequency of the experiment support structure about any
axis must be greater than or equal to 35 Hz. This can be verified by
analysis or test.
Y0
Type: Rotating, Space Shuttle referenced.
Origin: 200 in (5.1m) ahead of the nose
and 400 in (10.2m) below the center line of the cargo
bay.
Orientation and Labelling: The X axis is parallel to
the centerline of the cargo bay, negative in the
direction of launch. The Z axis is positive upward in the
landing attitude and the Y axis completes the right-
handed system. The standard subscript is O.
From the GAS Safety Manual
FIGURE 1 - Space Shuttle Coordinate System
Additional structural requirements are imposed on GAS payloads that utilize an
opening door assembly or compromise the sealed nature of the GAS canister by
modifying the containment provided by the GAS EMP (for example, payloads that attach
structure to the surface of the EMP external to the GAS canister). These payloads
must comply with the fracture control requirements of GSFC # 731-0005-83, General
Fracture Control Plan for Payloads Using the Space Transportation System.
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Verification of Basic Requirements
GAS experimenters have the option of ver'ifying structural integrity through
analysis only. Of course, the GAS experimenter may also test as long as the test
results are supported by an analysis. The two basic loading and vibration
requirements listed previously can thoroughly be verified using classical techniques
or finite element analysis. However, conducting a series of verification tests is
sometimes preferred due to the level of confidence and accuracy that it provides to
£he GAS experimenter. Since the struc£urai analysis or test report is reviewed
separately from the safety data package, the structural analysis/test report should
not be included within the safety data package. The structural analysis/test report
should be forwarded to GSFC as an independent document.
Structural Analysis
GAS experimenters are usually subjected to multiple iterations during the
structural review process. The initial structural analysis is often reviewed and
disapproved with a number of comments that must be answered before the structures
will receive approval. Verification of the basic requirements by analysis is not
always easy, and the following guidelines are provided to expedite the structural
revlew/approval process:
a) Description of Structure - The experimenter should introduce the
structural analysis document by including a detailed description of the
experiment support structure. This description should reference applicable
figures that clearly illustrate mounting interface with NASA hardware, primary
load bearing support structure, distribution and mounting of individual
experiment components as well as lateral support bumpers. A table indicating
the weight breakdown of experiment components and the location of the
components on the primary support structure should be included. Components
should be grouped in correlation to their location on the primary support
structure (for example, all components attached to an intermediate shelf would
be grouped together).
b) Material Properties - Material properties for the experiment support
structure and fasteners, such as the allowable loads and modulus of
elasticity, that are used in the structural calculations should be listed in
tabular form. These values should be obtained from MIL-HDBK-5.
c) Assumptions - The experimenter should establish assumptions that are
used in the structural analysis and calculations (for example, the assumption
that loadings result from the specified flight limit loads multiplied by the
applicable factor of safety and associated masses or the assumption that
thermal effects on the loading are negligible). The experimenter must be
careful when modelling the payload for structural calculations. Sometimes,
the assumptions of the structural model are not accurate and the experimenter
will oversimplify the model. The experimenter must clearly and appropriately
model the structure so that the calculations are not only accurate but easy to
follow.
d) Abbreviations - An abbreviations list should precede the structural
calculations.
e) Primary Load Bearing Structure - The stress analysis and fundamental
frequency analysis should address all main components of the experiment
structure that bear loads (for example, experiment structure that mounts to
the GAS EMP, experiment shelves-top, bottom and intermediate, support struts,
and side walls), because experimenters often neglect to analyze key load
bearing components of the experiment support structure.
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f) Margins of Safety - All primary structural parts and associated
attachment fasteners as well as the attachment fasteners for components that
weigh 5 pounds or more must be analyzed in detail for critical stresses and
must exhibit positive margins of safety. The margins of safety should be
based on the interactive method that considers the combined effects of tension
and shear stresses from loads applied simultaneously. This interactive
relation is given as follows:
Margin of Safety, M.S. = [I/(Rt 2 + Rs2) I/2] - 1
where, Rt = Tensile load (or stress)/Allowable tensile load (or stress)
R s = Shear load (or stress)/Allowable shear load (or stress)
Any type of buckling analysis (taking into account pre-loads as well as
inertial loads) for tubes or tube spacers and crippling strength analysis for
struts should include calculations showing positive margins of safety.
g) Fasteners - When analyzing fasteners, the assumption that fastener
shear force is reacted by friction is unacceptable. Shear loads must be
reacted by bolts or shear pins; however, bolt threads or inserts should not be
subjected to shear loads. The combined forces used in fastener analysis to
determine worst case loading must take into account the effect of combining
the bolt reactions. This means the loads applied to the fastener and the
moments (for example, overturning moments and twisting moments due to an
eccentricity of the component mounted) that result and cause additional bolt
tension and shear loads must be considered in the calculations. Bearing
stresses and combined local bending stresses should be examined in mounting
flanges and brackets.
h) Fundamental Frequency - GAS payload structures that utilize a set of
plates or shelves simply supported by struts with any number of intermediate
plates can often be modelled for fundamental frequency analysis. The plates
and support struts can basically be modelled as beams with equivalent loading
based on the mass from the mounting of experiment components. The fundamental
frequency can then be calculated by determining the properties of the modelled
beams by the beam support fixtures and then using classical beam equations.
The other option is to use finite element modelling with a frequency dynamics
run. Once again, the experimenter must be careful not to oversimplify the
structural model. Accurate assumptions and accurate beam modelling are
essential to analyze the experiment support structure's fundamental frequency.
i) Finite Element Analysis - If the experimenter chooses the finite element
method over classical techniques, the finite element model must be a detailed
math model (analytically simulating the mass and stiffness) with a level of
fidelity that accurately approximates all components of the experiment support
structure. The location and values of the stresses for finite element
analysis must be identified. An identification of the critical parts and
components in which the stresses occur should be included as well. The mesh
size used in the analysis must be appropriate to the type of run used (for
example, a dynamic run or stress run). The finite element analysis should
show deformed plots for both the dynamic and static load cases. This is to
verify that the deformations are consistent with applied loads. The analysis
should be detailed in the description of the application of accelerated loads.
The acceleration loads in the three axes should encompass a worst case
combination. The weight breakdown used in the analysis should be equivalent
to that of all experiment components. A frequency dynamics run can be used to
verify the fundamental frequency. The experimenter must clearly present the
methods and assumptions used in the finite element analysis along with a clear
description of the results that show structural compliance.
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j) Composites - Some GAS payloads use a fiberglass/epoxy or other composite
material for intermediate plates or trays to house experiments. It is
desirable to avoid placing composite structural members in the primary load
path. When composites are used, the experimenter must examine the connection
to the primary load path and make sure that the shear strength of the
composite material is sufficient to accommodate the required flight loads.
The composite must not delaminate under these conditions.
k) Welds - All welds used in structural applications must be verified in
accordance with MIL-STD-2219.
i) Conclusions - The experimenter should organize structural analysis
results and present them in a conclusion section. Margins of safety for
fasteners and the various components of the experiment support structure
should be listed in tabular form. The experimenter should briefly and clearly
summarize how the GAS structural requirements for loading and fundamental
frequency have been met through analysis of the components of the experiment
support structure.
Structura_ Tests
Some GAS experimenters elect to verify the experiment support structure
through testing. GAS experimenters prefer tests in some cases, because tests
provide more concrete results and more adequately exhibit actual experiment support
structure reactions to flight loads. Before testing, structural analysis is still
required to factors of safety of 1.25 for yield and 1.5 for ultimate over the flight
limit loads. Structural tests are then conducted to visually verify that the
structure can actually sustain the specified flight loading and still survive. The
GAS experimenter should provide a description of the test set-up, test procedures
followed, plots or other test results, and a summation of the test results that
clearly show verification of the structural flight requirements. A number of
structural tests are outlined below:
a) Static Loads Test - The static loads test is sometimes referred to as a
"pull test" and consists of loading or pulling the structure to 1.25 times the
flight limit loads. The experimenter can monitor the experiment support
structure response using strain gages or other methods. The static test
results are then correlated to determine if the stress and strain match those
predicted by analysis.
b) Sine Burst Test - The sine burst test is a low frequency (< 20 Hz) sine
test for 5 cycles at 100% of the test loads. The test load that should be
applied is 17.7 g's in each of the three axes. This test load includes the
required factor of safety (1.5) for the test. Again, the results should match
the predicted values determined by analysis.
c) Sine Sweep Test - The sine sweep test is used to verify the experiment
structure fundamental frequency. A harmonic vibration can be created by a
vibrationtable or other method, and the vibration should be forced at the
1/4 g, 1/2 g, or 1 g level. A sine function vibration sweep from 20 Hz to 200
Hz is applied and the associated, test result plots are used to determine the
resonant frequency.
d) Random Vibration Test - The random vibration test verifies workmanship
and results are not acceptable for structural verification. The GAS
experimenter is not required to conduct a random vibration test but may desire
to conduct such a test for confidence purposes. Appropriate levels may be
found in the GAS Experimenter Handb0ok.
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Fracture Control
Fracture control in accordance with GSFC 731-0005-83 is required for all GAS
payloads that utilize a door assembly or modify the containment provided by the GAS
EMP in the standard sealed GAS canister configuration. The GAS experimenter is
responsible for exhibiting compliance with these requirements through test or
analysis. Fracture control is required to prevent cracks, flaws, or other defects
from initiating in the structure and propagating to experiment support structure
failure. General requirements for such GAS payloads are covered below.
All structural components are assumed to have preexisting flaws in the most
critical locations and orientations. Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) establishes
the upper bound for the size of the preexisting flaw. Fracture mechanics determines
flaw growth and critical flaw size. A scatter factor of 4 is used in all fracture
mechanics analyses to account for material properties and uncertainties. The
eventual failure and separation of any part ! 1/4 ib is construed as a catastrophic
hazard to the Space Shuttle or crew.
Classifications
Every part of a GAS experiment will fall into one of the following 4
categories:
I) Low Released Mass - part has a mass < 1/4 pound.
2) Contained - all parts or fragments, of parts weighing _ 1/4 pound are
analyzed as being prevented by some barrier from entering the Space Shuttle
cargo bay.
3) Fail-Safe - due to structural redundancy, the structure that remains
after any single failure can withstand the redistributed loads.
4) Safe-Life - the largest undetected flaw that is assumed to preexist in a
part will not grow to failure under the cyclic and sustained loads encountered
in four complete mission lifetimes (including fabrication, testing,
transportation, lift-off, ascent, on-orbit, descent, landing, and post-landing
loads). Flaw growth software is often used to establish a part as safe-life.
In most cases, GAS payload parts will fall into one of the first 3 classifications
and therefore are non-fracture critical. The GAS experimenter is required to assess
all payload parts by these classifications and provide the analysis or test to
substantiate the classification. For more specific and individually applicable
requirements, the GAS experimenter should reference GSFC 731-0005-83.
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SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The structural safety assessment for inclusion in the safety data package
varies depending on the method of structural verification.
For verification by analysis the hazard assessment section should simply read,
"To ensure sufficient structural stability, the experiment support structure was
designed and built to withstand appropriate flight loads to an ultimate factor of
safety of 2.0, and the fundamental frequency about any axis is _ 35 Hz." The hazard
control verification should read, "Structural analysis has indicated compliance with
the appropriate flight limit loads and an ultimate factor of safety of 2.0. All
margins of safety are positive. Analysis indicates that the fundamental frequency
about any axis is greater than or equal to 35 Hz."
For verification by test the hazard assessment should simply read, "To ensure
sufficient structural stability, the experiment support structure was designed and
built to withstand appropriate flight loads with an ultimate factor of safety of
1.5, and the fundamental frequency about any axis is _ 35 Hz." The hazard control
verification section should read, "Structural tests have indicated compliance with
the appropriate flight limit loads to yield factor of safety of 1.25 and that the
fundamental frequency about any axis is greater than or equal to 35 Hz. Supporting
analysis has shown an ultimate factor of safety of 1.5. All margins of safety are
positive."
For GAS payloads requiring fracture control, an additional statement should be
added to the hazard assessment and hazard control verification section indicating
that the experiment support structure has been analyzed (or tested, if applicable)
in accordance with GSFC 731-0005-83. Also, it should be indicated that structural
fasteners have been selected in accordance with the GSFC Document #S-313-I00 and
employ positive retention.
To complete the structural safety assessment, a hazard report must be prepared
for the structural failure hazard. Two generic structural hazard (Figures 2 and 3)
reports are included for general reference and tailoring to specific experiment
structural design and verification methods.
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No.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT
PAYLOAD PHASE
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD GROUP
Structures Collision
HAZARD TITLE
Failure of Experiment Support Structure
DATE
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
NSTS 1700.7B 206 Failure Propagation
208.1 Structural Design
208.2 Emergency Landing Loads
208.3 Stress Corrosion
HAZARD CATEGORY
X Catastrophic
Critical
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD
During launch]landing operations, the experiment support structure fails resulting in release of the
experiment inside the GAS canister.
! IAZARD CAUSES
1. Inadequate structural design for launch and landing environment.
2. Improper materials selection.
tIAZARD CONTROLS
1. (a) Fundamental frequency of experiment support structure about any axis _>35 Hz.
(b) Experiment support structure designed to an ultimate Factor of Safety of 2.0 (or 1.5 for verification by
test) over appropriate flight limit loads with positive margins of safety.
(c) GAS canister containment of the experiment in the event of experiment support structure failure.
2. Materials selected in accordance with stress corrosion requirements of MSFC-SPEC-522B.
SAFETY VERIFICATION METItODS
1. (a) Sinusoidal vibration test or Vibration analysis.
(b) Structural analysis or Test to yield factor of safety of 1.25.
(c) GAS Canister Containment Analysis. Standard Sealed GAS Canister Assembly/Integration
Procedure.
2. GSFC Materials Branch (Code 313) review.
STATUS OF VERIFICATION
1. (a) Closed. Approved by GSFC (XX/XX/92).
(b) Closed. Approved by GSFC (XX/XX/92).
(c) Closed. GSFC Analysis GAS-CAN01-014 and Procedure GAS-CAN-08-011 to be performed
at KSC and documented in the Verification Tracking Log (VTL).
2. Closed. GSFC Materials Branch approval (XX/XX/92).
PItASE III APPROVALS
JSC Form 542B (Rev Nov 82
GAS P/L Mana6er
GAS Project Manager
GAS Safety Officer
STS
NASA-JSC
FIGURE 2- General Structural Hazard Report
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PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT
No.
PAYLOAD PHASE
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD GROUP
Structures Collision
ttAZARD TITLE
Failure of Experiment S.upport Structure
APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
NSTS 1700.7B:206 Failure Propagation
208.1 Structural Design
208.2 Emergency Landing Loads
208.3 Stress Corrosion
DATE
HAZARD CATEGORY
X Catastrophic
Critical
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD
Durin.g launch/landing operations, the experiment support structure fails resulting in release of the
experiment.
I 1AZARD CAUSES
1. Inadequate structural design for launch and landing environment.
2. Defective material.
3. Defects or flaws assumed to be present in the experiment structure propagate to failure.
tlazARD CONTROLS
1. (a) Fundamental frequency of experiment about any axis _>35 Hz.
Co) Experiment support structure designed to an ultimate Factor of Safety of 2.0 _ 1.5 for verification by
test) over appropriate limit loads with positive margins of safety.
2. Materials selected in accordance with stress corrosion requirements of MSFC-SPEC-522B.
3. The structure was designed in accordance with GSFC 731-0005-83, Rev. B, General Fracture
Control Plan for Payloads Using the STS. All payload elements are either low released mass, contained, or
fail-safe; therefore non-fracture critical.
SAFETY VERIFICATIONMETHODS
1. (a) Vibration Analysis or Vibration Test.
(b) Structural analysis or Test to yield factor of safet yof 1.25.
2. GSFC Materials Branch (Code 313) review.
3. Fracture Control Analysis or Test.
STATUS OF VERnaCATION
1. (a) Closed. Approved by GSFC (XX/XX/92).
(b) Closed. Approved by GSFC (XX/XX/92).
2. Closed. GSFC Materials Branch approval (XX/XX/92).
3. Closed. Approved by GSFC (XX/XX/92).
GAS P/L Manager GAS Safety Officer
PHASE III APPROVALS
GAS Project Manager , STS
JSC Form 542B (Rev Nov 82)
EIG.i2ILF_ - General Structural Hazard Report with Fracture Control
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